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When probability discounting (or probability weighting), one multiplies the
value of an outcome by one’s subjective probability that the outcome will obtain
in decision-making. The broader import of defending probability discounting is to
help justify cost-benefit analyses in contexts such as climate change. This chap-
ter defends probability discounting under risk both negatively, from arguments by
Caney (2008, 2009), and with a new positive argument. First, in responding to
Caney, I argue that small costs and benefits need to be evaluated, and that viewing
practices at the social level is too coarse-grained. Second, I argue for probability
discounting, using a distinction between causal responsibility and moral respon-
sibility. Moral responsibility can be cashed out in terms of blameworthiness and
praiseworthiness, while causal responsibility obtains in full for any effect which
is part of a causal chain linked to one’s act. With this distinction in hand, un-
like causal responsibility, moral responsibility can be seen as coming in degrees.
My argument is, given that we can limit our deliberation and consideration to that
which we are morally responsible for and that our moral responsibility for out-
comes is limited by our subjective probabilities, our subjective probabilities can
ground probability discounting.
1 Introduction
Probability discounting (or probability weighting) in decision-making is multiplying the
value of an outcome by one’s subjective probability that the outcome will occur.1 The
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broader import of defending probability discounting is to help justify cost-benefit anal-
yses in contexts such as climate change. In this chapter, I only address decisions under
risk. Decisions can be made under conditions of certainty, risk, and uncertainty.2 Under
certainty, the decision-maker knows the outcome of any of her decisions.3 Under risk,
she knows the potential outcomes of any of her decisions, and can assign probabilities
to any of those outcomes dependent on particular decisions. Finally, under uncertainty,
at least some outcome for at least some decision cannot be assigned a probability. My
defence of probability discounting applies only under risk. However, this is not unduly
limiting. At a theoretical level, the possibility of probability discounting does not arise
under the other conditions. At a practical level, evaluations of climate policy are almost
never done under conditions of full certainty, and many are performed under risk. (For
an overview of evaluations of climate policy under risk, please see Davidson (this vol-
ume xx).) So addressing probability discounting under risk is widely applicable. The
purpose of this chapter is thus to justify the use of probability discounting in contexts of
risk—but also cost-benefit analyses more broadly—using a new argument.
While such probability discounting is sometimes taken to be objectionable, it is also
sometimes taken to be uncontroversial. In this essay, I address both camps.
As a representative of the first sceptical camp, I consider an objection by Caney
(2008, 2009) in §2.4 Caney has been particularly influential in the climate debate and
argues that, if certain conditions obtain, it is morally impermissible to discount for prob-
ability. I argue that his conditions—which are meant to indicate when probability dis-
counting (and cost-benefit analysis) is impermissible—fail, since they overgeneralise.
Since climate change is plausibly construed as putting many people’s rights at risk, one
question which arises is how to assess the risk of a violation compared to a violation
which is certain to occur. Caney’s answer is that, at least under the assumption that
certain conditions (“R1-R4”) obtain, there is no difference in how we ought to assess
them: even putting human rights at risk is impermissible.
I argue that these conditions do not manage to do the work that Caney needs, and,
more generally, this type of approach is unworkable. The reason is that each individual
action may increase risks of violation only in very small increments and it is only once
these risks are aggregated that initially plausible conditions like Caney’s R1-R4 are sat-
isfied. At least in theory, cost-benefit analyses with probability discounting are sensitive
enough on the individual level to compare the small incremental risks and the marginal
benefits of individual actions.
Among those in the second camp who take probability discounting to be uncontro-
versial, many refer to the decision-theory literature. However, probability discounting
has not received a more catholic defence. My suggestion is to offer a defence of proba-
bility discounting which does not rely upon decision-theoretic axioms that those outside
of decision-theory may not accept. My intention in §3 is to address those skeptical of
probability discounting with a new normative defence. This defence can be taken as
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complementary to decision-theoretic defences. The complementarity, for those who are
already sympathetic to the decision-theoretic defences of probability discounting, lies
in my argument’s reinforcement of this conclusion.
My argument involves distinguishing between causal responsibility and moral re-
sponsibility, where moral responsibility for an effect can be cashed out in terms of
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness and causal responsibility for an effect requires
only that that effect is part of a causal chain issuing from one’s act. With this distinction
in hand, moral responsibility can be seen as coming in degrees. My argument is that,
given that we can limit our deliberation and consideration to that which we are morally
responsible for, and that our moral responsibility for outcomes is limited by our sub-
jective probabilities, it follows that our subjective probabilities can ground probability
discounting.
Finally, in §4, I conclude with some suggestions about what this means for long-term
decision-making. I think that the argument allows us to ground probability discounting
in normative terms such as moral responsibility. Evaluations of climate change can be
grounded, on this argument, in our moral responsibility which—on the assumption that
our subjective probabilities decrease with respect to time—itself decreases with respect
to time. This argument also shows that it is permissible for individuals to engage in
(mini) cost-benefit analyses with probability discounting.
2 Caney’s Objections to Probability Discounting
In an argument against discounting for probability in the context of climate change,
Caney (2009, p. 176) writes “A sound response to the current climate change, I sug-
gest, would prescribe exactly the same course of action . . . to mitigating climate change
as would be appropriate if it were known that the malign effects would definitely oc-
cur.”5 Essentially, the point is that, from the perspective of rights-based theories, “high”
probabilities of rights violations are just as impermissible to bring about as certainty of
rights violations.6 In effect, this means that cost-benefit analyses should or need not be
performed in these circumstances, and the actions which lead to high probabilities of
violations should be avoided.
I begin by addressing Caney’s particular conditions for cases where these actions
simply should not be performed, before explaining what I think is wrong with this ap-
proach. The problem is that, if we look at practices at the social level using his approach,
we lose subtle gradations in levels of risk for individual actions and the corresponding
individual benefits of introducing small increments of risk. And for Caney’s approach
to work, we do have to look at practices at the social level, because his argument is
about climate change and any given individual’s emissions in isolation do not materi-
ally increase the probability of rights-violations (let alone introduce high probabilities
of rights-violations).
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Caney suggests four conditions meant to distinguish between cases in which proba-
bility discounting is warranted or unwarranted. He writes that the four conditions may
not all be necessary, but if all are satisfied in some instance, then this justifies treat-
ing risky outcomes the same way as certain outcomes. I argue that Caney’s conditions,
which are meant to apply to the social practice of excessive carbon emitting, apply in
an analogous manner to another case: the social practice of driving cars. The first clari-
fication to make is that the relevant comparison is about the permissibility of pervasive
social practices. The second clarification to make is that, obviously, my claim is not that
driving cars is in all respects analogous to excess emitting, but that the practice satisfies
the four conditions Caney endorses, which is enough to show that the argument gener-
alizes beyond what he intends. In other words, this is meant as a reductio—someone
who endorses the conclusion that the practice of driving cars is impermissible need not
be troubled by my remarks. However, I doubt there are many who would be willing to
endorse this claim and Caney himself denies it (2009, p. 179-180).
First, here are Caney’s four rights conditions applied to emissions and climate change
(2009, p. 177-9):
R1 The changes to the climate involve both (a) a high probability of severe threats to
large numbers of persons’ fundamental human rights and (b) a possibility of even
more catastrophic threats to fundamental human rights.
R2 Affluent members of the world can abstain from emitting high levels of greenhouse
gases, and thereby exposing others to risk, without loss of their own human rights.
R3 The risks of dangerous climate change will fall disproportionately on those whose
human rights are already violated.
R4 The benefits that arise when the affluent of the world emit high levels of greenhouse
gases falls almost entirely to them, and not to those most at risk from climate
change.
Now consider an everyday example of risky behaviour, driving cars. I argue that this
example of a social practice satisfies analogous conditions. This case certainly satisfies
(R1): drivers kill, either through irresponsibility or bad luck, many people daily. In the
United States, the costs are tens of thousands of lives, orders of magnitude more non-
fatal injuries, and a total of hundreds of billions of dollars annually in economic losses
and social harms. It is not the case that any given driver has a very high probability
of killing other road-users; however, it is the case that the social practice of driving
leads to a high probability of severe threats to the fundamental human rights of many. I
would also agree with Caney that driving satisfies (R2): “the emissions stemming from
driving cars, taking plane flights, poorly insulated housing, and inefficient energy use
[must be cut to] avoid dangerous climate change, but the loss involved cannot be said
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to compromise any human rights” (2009, p. 179). In defending (R3), Caney appeals to
the income disparity between nations more at risk from climate change (mainly in the
global south) and those less at risk (mainly in the global north). Since those most at risk
from climate change are—independently of climate change—disproportionately poorer,
they are more likely to suffer from human rights violations. Similarly, we can consider
the risks from driving. On average, those most at risk from the practice of driving cars
are those who do not themselves drive cars (the so-called “vulnerable road users” such
as pedestrians and cyclists) (e.g. Shinar 2012; Tiwari 2015).7 Those who do not drive
cars are disproportionately likely to be unable to afford cars so will be—independently
of car driving—disproportionately poorer. Thus, by analogous reasoning, they too will
be more likely to suffer from human rights violations. However, Caney is aware that
driving cars might be a case that satisfies his conditions, and this is not a conclusion he
endorses. So he addresses car driving in the discussion for (R4):
. . . one might think that it is permissible for some to drive motor vehicles
even though they pose a fatal threat to some because the risky activity is
part of an equitable scheme which is generally beneficial, including to the
risk-bearers. Even nondrivers might value the practice of driving—it means
that their friends and family can visit, goods can get transported promptly
from one end of the country to another, food gets delivered to shops still
fresh, business and personal correspondence can arrive swiftly, and so on.
(Caney 2009, p. 179-180)
The purpose of (R4), Caney continues, is that it distinguishes between cases like climate
change and driving. My objection is that it is doubtful that such a consideration is
enough to distinguish between the two cases.
How can we measure the benefits from excess emissions or driving? We can con-
sider possible worlds in which we do not benefit from the risky behaviours. We are not
considering ideal possible worlds, but closer non-ideal worlds where people also often
fail their duties, but scale down dramatically (or even completely) the risky behaviours
under consideration. So in a world where there is (almost) no driving, for example,
perishable foodstuffs would have to be consumed sooner and would have to be sourced
locally. In this world, there would be less capability to visit those far away. It would
mean that serious injuries might not be treated in time (this is a friendly addition to
Caney’s argument). If we stopped (almost) entirely the practice of driving cars, Caney
is right that some of these costs would be borne by risk-bearers (non-drivers).
However, a world where there were dramatically reduced emissions would similarly
have costs which would be borne by risk-bearers (non-affluent countries). Roughly a
third of global emissions stem from transportation. To cut this down significantly would
greatly change the world. Assuming that all of the global emissions are scaled down
proportionately, this would restrict many aspects of global transportation. For instance,
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Bangladesh, which is at severe risk from climate impacts, would have limited access
to world markets for clothing; the workers in Hong Kong would have limited access
to global markets for electronic goods; countries with disparities in resources would be
less able to trade. There would also be less transportation that allows for foreign aid
and medical support: mosquito nets would be less distributable to sub-Saharan Africa;
fewer tetanus and measles vaccinations would be sent to Iraq; in the case of sudden
disasters, it would be less feasible to react internationally with aid; and it may not have
been possible to eradicate polio. These are just some of the consequences of reducing
transportation emissions; reductions in other sectors might well have other impacts for
the risk-bearers. In short, like driving, emissions from affluent countries are part of a
scheme which generates benefits, including to the risk-bearers.
Obviously, it is only a fraction of the gains associated with excessive emissions that
are distributed in these laudable ways, but we are considering a world where all of the
activities associated with significant affluent emissions are ratcheted down.8 My claim
is that, just as in (R4), there are substantial gains to non-drivers and society at large from
transport as well. Or enough gains that it is plausible that the analogue of (R4) fails in
the case of excess emissions.
Caney might respond that these are not the “excessive” emissions he was consid-
ering, so they are not part of the relevant social practice. However, this response will
not work for three reasons. First, such a response would raise a worry about ad hoc
emendations to the theory. If we define “excess” emissions as only the emissions that
we have moral or social objections to, then not only would this be less possible to apply,
it would invite worries about being merely dialectically motivated.
Second, his R1-R4 are not sensitive enough to pick out the excess emissions gen-
erated which are not necessary to maintain the human rights of those emitting, and
it is R1-R4 that are under consideration. For instance, they do not distinguish between
emissions by the affluent who are travelling with NGOs to distribute bed nets, medicine,
trade, or aid and those who are merely travelling for holidays.
Finally, and most importantly, he cannot add a condition that says we are including
only those cases where the emissions are for a sufficiently good cause or have positive
outcomes which outweigh their increase to the threats to human rights (via climate
change), since that is precisely the kind of cost-benefit analysis condition that he is
trying to avoid or supplant with the conditions R1-R4. The purpose of a cost-benefit
analysis is precisely to be sensitive to the cumulative effect of smaller (or larger) benefits
and costs. On my reading of Caney’s argument, his intention is to suggest conditions
which supplant cost-benefit analyses by being grounded in human rights. If he appeals
to the aggregation of more mundane considerations, then he is engaged in cost-benefit
analysis by another name.
So either (R4) is not a plausible condition to determine whether a cost-benefit anal-
ysis applies, or, following Caney, it implies that on rights-based theories, drivers are
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rights-violators to precisely the same extent as if we were all certain that we would kill
when driving, i.e. it is impermissible to drive cars. I think most people would view this
as a reductio of Caney’s conditions.9
This third point leads to my general worry. The worry is that, while such a rights-
based view does not greatly differ from a probability discounter at the level of social
practice—since the non-discounter does take into account that the practice must in ag-
gregate have a “high” probability of threats to fundamental human rights—it does not
give any weight to small individual benefits. Thus, this view does not allow one to com-
pare (i) practices where each instance of the practice has an infinitesimal marginal ad-
dition to the probability of fundamental violations to (ii) practices where each instance
of the practice has a more substantial marginal addition to the probability of funda-
mental violations. If the practices are widespread enough, the non-discounter will not
be able to distinguish between these practices because, in aggregate, both will involve
high probabilities of threats to large numbers of persons’ fundamental human rights.
Furthermore, if we are focussed on rights-violations, we will not be able to compare
practices where the benefits are minor or major in each instance of the practice, so long
as the benefits are never required for upholding fundamental human rights. The type of
view that Caney endorses does not allow for fine-grained evaluation, unlike cost-benefit
analyses with probability discounting. This coarseness matters, since small costs and
benefits can in aggregate be very important, even if they do not directly relate to human
rights—for instance, the social benefits of driving and extra emissions.
So far, I have explained why Caney’s argument against probability discounting is
unsuccessful. However, I can offer more: a positive moral argument that discounting
for probability is permissible. I turn to this in the next section.
3 A Positive Argument for Probability Discounting
A moral commonplace in everyday life is that one is not fully morally responsible for
all the consequences of one’s actions. If cashed out in terms of reactive attitudes, we
might say that one is not fully blameworthy (or praiseworthy) for indefinitely many ef-
fects of one’s actions. It is true that one is morally responsible for the immediate and
predictable consequences, but as one’s knowledge of the effects lessen, it is less and
less reasonable to hold one fully morally responsible.10 In this section, I argue that this
commonplace about moral responsibility can ground a defence of probability discount-
ing in rational decision-making. In the conclusion, I will discuss how this argument
might apply both at the individual level and the social level, with an eye towards so-
cial applications to evaluations of climate change policy. I believe, but do not argue
here, that responsibility at the social level is not unlike responsibility at the individual
level. There are some interesting differences, mainly related to greater limitations on
individual decision-making, and I discuss these in §4.
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When I call in sick to work, I am morally responsible for the foreseeable consequences—
my colleagues having a larger workload, my boss having to reschedule her meeting, etc.
The unexpected effects of these effects I am less morally responsible for: that my harder
working colleague has to miss dinner with her wife; that my boss ends up with no spaces
in her agenda. The effects of these effects I am even less responsible for. And so, when
I am deciding whether to call in sick, I do not have to fully include these further effects
in my calculation, because I have diminished (or no) morally responsibility for these
effects.
Moral responsibility is a complex concept. My arguments are not meant to charac-
terize it, let alone define it. They are based on a particular claim about moral responsi-
bility, which I take to be consistent with many different substantive accounts: that one
can have less than full moral responsibility—understood as levels of, inter alia, blame-
worthiness and praiseworthiness—for some outcomes. Whatever conditions one takes
to be necessary and/or sufficient for moral responsibility, this argument is intended to
demonstrate an additional layer: the level of moral responsibility is lessened by certain
kinds of ignorance. So, although the focus on subjective probability may be surprising
in a discussion of moral responsibility, it is best thought of as an emendation. The ar-
gument is also meant to apply widely, not just to actions with significant moral import,
such as those involving pain and death, but also everyday actions, like listening to loud
music in public.11 The argument, schematically, is very simple:
1. Sometimes, we do not have full moral responsibility for the effects of our actions.
2. The most plausible explanation for (1) is that moral responsibility is limited by
the subjective probabilities of particular effects.
∴ 3. Moral responsibility is limited by the subjective probabilities of particular effects.
[1,2, abduction]
4. It is rational to exclude that which you are not morally responsible for from de-
liberation.
∴ 5. It is rational to exclude from deliberation outcomes to the extent that they are
limited by subjective probabilities of particular effects. [3,4, deduction]
Premise (1) captures the idea that moral responsibility for effects or consequences
of an action are not always full or complete. There is a separate sense of responsibility
which is always full, which is sometimes called causal responsibility, for which any
effect of one’s act is fully one’s responsibility. It is in this latter causal sense that re-
sponsibility is fully transitive or iterative. For instance, if I scribble down my grocery
list and some biologist happens to read the grocery list and has a flash of inspiration and
develops a new strain of guava, I (or my writing of the list) might be causally respon-
sible, although it would be odd to say that I am morally responsible. I would suggest
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that common sense has it that there is a sense of responsibility which is not always
full, unlike this causal sense. According to this common sense, one can diminish one’s
responsibility for the effects of an action by showing that one did not know that those
effects would follow. In other words, if the effects are surprising or unforeseen, then
this can have some exculpatory force. It is this moral sense of responsibility that my
argument relies upon, and I use this sense from here on except where explicitly noted.
To motivate Premise (2), i.e. that it is subjective probability that is changing the level
of moral responsibility, I present several cases. Here is the first:
Chemistry—Certainty: Tamara, a high school student, has a lab experi-
ment to conduct. She is following the instructions she has written down on
the chemicals to mix: X and Y . However, she knows that X and Y explode
when combined, and when she mixes them, they do indeed explode, leading
to significant property damage.12
Tamara intuitively is morally responsible (and blameworthy) for this property damage,
and also causally responsible. We can change the case so that she does not know about
this consequence (i.e. she assigns the probability of an explosion less than 1, maybe
even close to 0):
Chemistry—Low/High Risk: Tamara does not know that X and Y explode
when combined, but when she mixes them, they do explode, leading to sig-
nificant property damage. There are two subcases. In the first, Tamara has
a low subjective probability that X and Y explode (e.g. she copied her in-
structions for mixing them out of her textbook or another generally reliable
source). In the second, Tamara has a high subjective probability that X and
Y explode, although she also does not know (e.g. she knows that sometimes
she accidentally writes down chemical Y instead of chemical Z, or that she
knows she was not paying full attention when she was taking notes).
In the Low Risk subjective probability case, where Tamara thinks it very unlikely that
she has made a mistake, Tamara has less responsibility. In contrast, in the High Risk
subjective probability case, where Tamara has reasons to believe that her instructions
might be in error, she has greater responsibility.
Since the only differences between Low and High Risk cases is the subjective prob-
ability Tamara would assign to the explosion, that is a good explanation for the assigned
level of responsibility.
An objector might suggest a different explanation: in particular, that the relevant
probability is not subjective probability, but objective probability. Such an objector may
remind us that individuals sometimes have very inaccurate probability assignments. As
Smart (1973, p. 40) writes, “The ordinary man is frequently irrational in his moral
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thinking. And if he can be irrational about morals why cannot he be irrational about
probabilities? The fact that the ordinary man thinks that he can weigh up probabilities
in making prudential decisions does not mean that there is really any sense in what he
is doing.”
It is manifest that individual subjective probabilities may diverge significantly from
the actual ones. This is true in my Chemistry cases; in fact, the objective probabilities
that X and Y will explode in each of these cases is 1 and that objective probability
diverges from Tamara’s subjective probabilities in each Risk case. However, if one has
the same intuitions as I do—namely, having more or less credence in this outcome (as
in High Risk/Low Risk) affects her level of moral responsibility—then it is subjective
probability and not objective probability that is relevant for responsibility.
An objector could press a separate case. One could say that in Low/High Risk it is
relevant whether Tamara has tried to improve her subjective probabilities. She is fully
morally responsible, one might claim, in all the cases because she should do all that
she can to improve her probabilities, say by rechecking about the explosive potential
of X and Y with another authoritative source.13 In this manner, the “excess” moral
responsibility attaches to her epistemic practices.
There are at least three responses that could be offered. The first response to this
objection is that one is epistemically responsible for assigning the right subjective prob-
abilities, but this is distinct at the point of decision from any moral responsibility for
acting upon these probabilities. So we can epistemically criticize the individual for
having generated the wrong probabilities up to the point of decisions, but the moral re-
sponsibility is still a function of the subjective probabilities the individual had assigned
at the point of decision. This might also act as a response to someone who endorses
evidential probability, a theory according to which the correct probability is the prob-
ability that draws on the evidence that is available to the individual (e.g. Zimmerman
2008, 2014).14 On this theory, it is sensible to say that the individual is being epis-
temically irresponsible (or irrational) if their evidential probabilities diverge from their
subjective probabilities. But their moral responsibility is still a function of their subjec-
tive probabilities at the point of action.
A second response would be to point out that it is easy to conflate moral respon-
sibility for some action φ-ing and moral responsibility for a different action ψ-ing that
would have changed one’s information about φing. These may be conflated, for in-
stance, because in both cases, the responsibility attaches to the same individual, and
ψ-ing affects whether or not the individual φs. Because of this potential conflation, it is
important to distinguish between which party is morally responsible and their level of
moral responsibility. For the purposes of this argument, I am primarily concerned with
the latter. This account can also handle actions like updating one’s information—one
is responsible to the extent that one would have a subjective probability that an action
which updates one’s information (e.g. ψ-ing) would have the effect in question.15 To
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illustrate, suppose that a doctor prescribes some medication believing there are no rele-
vant counterindications. The doctor turns out to be wrong. An objector might say that,
even though the doctor had (for instance) a low subjective probability that the med-
ication had counterindications (say, because they had checked the counterindications
recently), we are likely to hold him responsible, i.e. blame him. However, it is not im-
portant for my purposes to determine whom we are blaming (that is not in doubt), but
why and to what extent we are blaming. Presumably, the reason we blame the doctor
is not for prescribing a medicine they thought was safe. Indeed, that act is praisewor-
thy. We blame the doctor for failing to check the indications. But I think the subjective
probabilities matter again: if the doctor had good (subjective) reasons to think that there
were no counterindications, then we should blame her less for failing to check, even
if those reasons were ultimately misleading. If we assigned full blameworthiness for
failing to check, then we would also have to assign full blameworthiness for failing to
re-check each time the medicine is prescribed, or perhaps even more often. But this
seems implausible; at some point, it no longer makes sense to spend time ascertaining
counterindications and to spend time on patients who need it. So the blameworthiness
must be diminishing as well. Again, this is what one should accept if one judges Tamara
less responsible in Low Risk than in High Risk.
I think these first two responses may be too concessive, however. A third response
would be to try to undermine the intuition that one is morally responsible for poor
epistemic practices. For instance, one could argue that such an intuition is problematic,
since it is asymmetrical. Epistemic practices which lead to mistaken beliefs in cases
with good outcomes do not seem blameworthy in the same manner that practices in
cases with bad outcomes seem blameworthy. The intuition I want to undermine is that,
even if Tamara was in Low Risk, she is still morally responsible (blameworthy) for her
epistemic state of being in Low Risk. Let us consider a contrasting case:
Donation (Low/High Risk): Meili has several different codes for all the
accounts or payments she makes. She intends to load a substantial amount
of money onto her prepaid coffee card (e.g. her expected annual coffee bud-
get), but she enters the wrong code and instead sends it to a charity which
does good.16 She is aware that it is possible that she used the wrong code.
There are two subcases. In the first, Meili has a low subjective probability
that she used the wrong code (e.g. she recently used her codes and knows
that her recent attempts were successful). In the second, Meili has a high
subjective probability that she used the wrong code, although she also does
not know she did (e.g. she knows that regularly she forgets which of these
codes is which).
For the objector whose intuition is that Tamara has moral responsibility for her epis-
temic practices which led to her being in Low Risk, an analogous claim about Meili in
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Low Risk is unconvincing. It sounds absurd to claim that Meili is morally blamewor-
thy for failing to check the codes in order to switch her payment away from charity.
This undermines the intuition in Tamara’s Low Risk case, since the intuition does not
generalize.
Since it is beyond the scope of this chapter, I offer only brief and tentative remarks
about how to explain the intuition. One is a (reverse) halo effect. The halo effect is the
bias to associate extra positive properties to individuals with positive properties. By re-
verse halo, I mean that, since we already blame Tamara for causing the property damage,
we may be prone to judge her negatively in other ways as well. In particular, we might
judge her epistemic practices as morally problematic, even though epistemic responsi-
bility and moral responsibility should be kept separate. A more interesting and specula-
tive possibility is this asymmetry is connected to the Knobe (2006) effect, whereby attri-
butions of praiseworthiness/blameworthiness (and intentionality) are asymmetrically a
function of the moral desirability of side-effects. I take it as given that this asymmetry is,
at least prima facie, problematic. Here, the asymmetry may come from a similar set-up;
instead of the outcomes being side-effects of a stated goal, the outcomes are acciden-
tal outcomes which occur instead of their goals. In short, we blame an individual for
not avoiding a negative outcome, whether that outcome was a side-effect of a separate
goal or unexpectedly occurred instead of the goal. In the former case, this blame means
imputing intentionality to the individual, whereas in the latter case, since blame for the
action may be limited by their expectations, the “excess” blame is shifted to subjective
probabilities. That this shift is asymmetrical can be seen by considering Donation, and
that the shift is asymmetrical suggests that the shift is illegitimate.
Now, I can move on to Premise (4), which tells us that, in deliberation, it is rational
to exclude that which you are not responsible for. I suspect this premise is straight-
forwardly or conceptually true, but I offer some justification regardless. Just as it is
irrational to spend unlimited time and energy trying to attain certainty about what con-
sequences will follow from an action (recall that the consequences might be extremely
spatially or temporally distant!), it is irrational to include potential consequences for
which one is not responsible. This is most obvious when considering consequences
which one cannot affect. Such consequences are not one’s moral responsibility and so,
given we are finite beings, it is irrational for us to consider them. If we also accept that
this is the case with consequences which one could affect, but which are not one’s moral
responsibility, then this is sufficient for (4). In other words, the reason to adopt Premise
(4) is that it unifies or systematizes the considerations that may be permissibly excluded
from decision-making. I think it is a sensible limitation on decision-making, as it helps
to prevent it from becoming implausibly onerous on finite beings like ourselves.
With (3) and (4), it is easy to see how rational deliberation will limit outcomes to the
extent of the subjective probabilities, giving us (5). Finally, since probability discount-
ing is a way of representing this exclusion mathematically, it can be used to exclude
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outcomes from deliberation. Mathematically, the way to exclude the outcomes to the
extent given by subjective probability is just to weight (i.e. multiply) the outcomes by
their subjective probability. This argument demonstrates that, when decision-making
under risk, probability discounting is defensible when taking responsibility into consid-
eration.
4 Additions and Extensions
There are interesting decision-theoretic arguments and axiomatic derivations of the
claim that it is rational to weight outcomes by the subjective probabilities that those out-
comes will occur. Many of these hold that rationality implies that decision-makers will
try to maximize the satisfaction of their preferences, assuming that their preferences are
sufficiently coherently structured. These are targeted towards idealized decision-makers
with rational preferences. The arguments I have presented are targeted in a slightly
different manner; they are aimed at interlocutors who find these decision-theoretic con-
clusions and axioms less plausible. I think them more plausible since they are based
on the claim that it is rational for decision-makers to focus their decision-making by
limiting things in their decision-making.
Now, in practice, I would hypothesize that such cost-benefit analyses are a good
model for actual decision-making for individuals, with two considerations or qualifica-
tions. The first is that individuals have very coarse-grained probability increments, so
I suspect it is descriptively more accurate that individuals work with categories such
as “unlikely” or “almost definitely not” or “almost certainly” and that these can only
roughly be mapped onto a range of probabilities in percentage terms (e.g. 10-25% or
0-10% or 90-100%, respectively). Responsibility on my argument would then be just as
coarse-grained as the probability categories a given individual is working with.
The second consideration is that individuals tend to round probabilities up and down,
such that small probabilities get rounded down to 0% (impossibility) and high proba-
bilities get rounded up to 100% (certainty) (cf. Kahneman 2011). This matters greatly
for simplifying decision-making, since most of the distant consequences or effects of
an action are very difficult to predict (or have very small effective subjective probabili-
ties). For individual decision-making, this means that many potential consequences are
given negligible probabilities and, due to this psychological quirk, tend to round those
to 0%, weighting those outcomes by 0 and discounting them from the decision-making
entirely.17
I suspect that both of these considerations make the decision-making account given
here descriptively more accurate. But I also think that adopting these considerations
is more normatively defensible or rational for individuals than for social groups, since
a proper cost-benefit analysis involving all of the imaginable or foreseeable potential
outcomes—even those with very small probabilities—would be so cognitively taxing
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for individuals as to be unworkable.
However, when the stakes are high, I think it is best for individuals to try to mitigate
both of these caveats and take the cognitive effort required to do so. Furthermore, I think
that at the social and political level, decision-makers should always try to avoid these
effects. Social and political decision-making do not, at least in theory, have as many
limitations as individuals do in day-to-day decision-making and so should include, with
as fine probability assignments as possible, all the outcomes that can be predicted. There
may well be practical limitations, but simplifications should be tolerated in fewer cases
than for individual decision-making. This is the case with evaluations of projects in the
context of climate change.
My argument implies that, if our subjective probabilities of the effects of our climate-
altering actions decrease with respect to time, we have decreasing moral responsibility
for effects which do occur. As for what the subjective probabilities are, and who the
relevant “we” are, reports issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
should be seen as a legitimate first approximation of the state of published science so I
would suggest anyone who has reasonable access to the results of these reports should
be included in this “we” and the subjective probabilities should reflect the IPCC reports.
In fact, due to the level of agreement required for information to be included in the
reports, they are likely to be conservative in their assessments.
A final point to make is that the probability discounting endorsed here does not
conflict with or double-count if one already endorses probability discounting for ax-
iomatic reasons (for instance). It offers an alternative route to the claim that one ought
to discount by subjective probabilities, a route which is meant to be normatively and
intuitively acceptable. By buttressing the conclusion in a context divorced from the
decision-theoretic axioms, it is intended to make this conclusion more palatable to a
wider audience. In this way, we can justifiably use cost-benefit analyses even in con-
texts which concern costs and benefits over the very long-term, as with climate change.
Notes
1It is not meant to be confused with either utility discounting or consumption discounting, such as
discussed in (Broome 1992, 1994; Dasgupta 2008; Parfit 1984; Stern 2007), among many others. In
particular, it is not the same as the special category of consumption discounting that Parfit (1984) calls
probabilistic discounting. The latter picks out consumption discount rates which are justified by reference
to probabilities. The type of discounting under consideration could potentially be used to justify proba-
bilistic discounting, but it is not directly about discount rates at all. The kind of probability in question is
also sometimes called ex ante probability.
2A seminal paper for the literature on these distinctions is (Ellsberg 1961).
3I use the terms “consequence” and “effect” synonymously, but use “outcome” to indicate the entire
set of consequences (or effects) that result from an action. For expositional simplicity, I assume that the
probability an individual assigns to an outcome is the same as their credence in that outcome.
4Caney (2009, p. 196) agrees that probability discounting only applies under risk, and mentions that
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this is a limitation, since we do not always have solid grounds for subjective probability assignments,
especially in the context of climate change. However, the argument in (Caney 2009) which I engage with
here presumes that we have probabilities of rights violations, so the argument in question does presume
decision-making under risk.
5Caney writes this in terms of money spent, but this either means he is suggesting no consumption
discounting, which he explicitly denies, or, more plausibly, is simply a means to the morally relevant
consequences.
6Caney is not explicit about what probabilities constitute “high”, but for the purposes of the critique
here, I do not focus on the arbitrariness of setting any particular special threshold, although I believe that
any such specification would invite new objections.
7Of course, when drivers are not driving cars, they may be at risk just as much as non-drivers. How-
ever, over a lifetime, or any other given span of time, non-drivers will spend more time than drivers as
vulnerable road users and at disproportionate risk.
8There would be good consequences in these worlds, too! For instance, world wars might become
technically infeasible. However, in line with (R4), we are only considering the actual benefits of risky
behaviors, i.e. the costs in these possible worlds which are avoided in the actual world.
9I should point out that I am not making this argument simply because I intend to justify probability
discounting; I actually think, to be consistent, that rights-based theorists should be this concerned about
driving cars, along with many other technologies which are potentially rights-violating. Although it may
well be infeasible to go back to a society without any rights-endangering transportation technologies, I
think rights-based theories lead us to the conclusion that such a society would be in that respect morally
superior.
10Of course, I am not intending to imply that knowing is always extensionally equivalent with assigning
a probability of 1, nor that not knowing is in general extensionally equivalent with assigning a probability
of less than 1, but using the term in this manner is, I believe, perspicuous in the current context.
11If one takes the concept of moral responsibility to apply only in a narrow range of morally weighty
circumstances, please treat my wider usage as stipulative.
12Many of the examples in the literature involve death (e.g. Harman 2015; Parfit 2011). I think this is
problematic, since we have laws against killing, even when it is accidental or unintended (“manslaugh-
ter”), or when it is intended but unsuccessful (“attempted murder”). So one could think that another is
morally responsible for some unsuccessful or unintentional killing, when one is instead conflating re-
sponsibility for the other’s killing for these other legally punishable offences. Another issue is that moral
responsibility for murder might be so great that it is difficult to tell the difference between an intuition of
complete moral responsibility for murder and (say) quarter responsibility for murder: both might be so
much greater than any day-to-day level of moral responsibility as to be intuitively indistinguishable in the
assignment of blame. For these reasons, none of my examples involve death.
13Sepielli (2009), for instance, distinguishes between narrow-scope and wide-scope norms, depending
on whether the norm applies to an individual given the set of subjective probabilities they have or whether
the norm is satisfied by the individual also doing some action which leads them to revise their subjec-
tive probabilities; Harman (2015) makes a similar distinction (between “blameworthiness for behavior”
and “blameworthiness for causing that behavior”). My first response is addressed to narrow-scopers or
those who want to retain Harman’s distinction; my second is aimed at undermining these distinctions.
One advantage of losing this distinction—making actions aimed at epistemic updating just extra choice
possibilities—is that we have a more unified concept of moral responsibility (or blameworthiness) with-
out it. However, both Sepielli’s and Harman’s discussions are about blameworthiness in the presence
of moral uncertainty; mine is about non-moral uncertainty, which I believe to be more relevant in the
context of climate change since most plausible moral systems converge decisively on urgent action (e.g.
Stern 2014, 2015).
14Of course, there is the further worry for evidential probability advocates about how to specify which
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evidence is “available to the individual”, but that is well known (e.g. Timpe 2009).
15On my account, one always has some moral responsibility for not gathering more information, but
that responsibility diminishes the less helpful one thinks information gathering would be.
16Let me stipulate that such charities exist, and, in climate contexts, an existence proof for such a good
charity is one that helps indigenous people to protect rainforest, CoolEarth, www.coolearth.org.
17On the assumption that the subjective probabilities will decrease with respect to time, perhaps con-
sistently, these two considerations allow us to answer the worries of Lenman (2000), about one’s inability
to determine all of the consequences of an action (see also Burch-Brown 2014). If one cannot know all of
the consequences of one’s actions, Lenman argues, then one cannot ever know that one acts rightly. My
argument shows that, even for a consequentialist, it is rational to act even if one does not know rightly
since it is rational to probability discount according to one’s subjective probabilities. For very difficult
to foresee future events, rounding down to 0%—even if they may occur!—I suggest to be rationally
defensible for finite beings like ourselves.
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